


# Dynamically Learning Incentives for Load Control

**Joshua Comden**, Adam Lechowicz\*,  
Andrey Bernstein, Guido Cavraro  
Data-Enabled Decision-Making in  
Energy Systems and Markets  
2024 INFORMS Annual Meeting  
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\*UMass Amherst and NREL



Load Set Points




Don't touch my thermostat!

I'm not eating at midnight!

Freedom!

## Direct Load Control

- System Operator directly controls loads to provide services to the grid
- Low Participation



This is not good time to charge my EV.

Price is not my concern.

Prices? Time?


## Indirect Load Control

- System Operator sends prices to influence the load amounts
- Unpredictable response


**Problem:** Grid operators lack control over end-user load behavior.

**Approach:** Dynamically optimize individualized incentives paired with load set points.


### Human Behavior Model




### Incentive Optimization



### Numerical Evaluation






## Incentivized Load Control

- Incentive amounts are based on **historical** performance with helping **grid objectives**.


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
### Human Behavior Model




### Incentive Optimization



### Numerical Evaluation



# Human Response to Incentives



## Assumptions


### Monotonicity

$$\|g_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i}^{(1)}) - \mathbf{u}^*\| \leq \|g_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i}^{(2)}) - \mathbf{u}^*\|$$

$$\mathbf{i}^{(1)} \succeq \mathbf{i}^{(2)}$$

### Ability to incentivize to get set point

$$\exists \mathbf{i}^* \text{ s.t. } g_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i}^*) = \mathbf{u}^*$$



## Realistic Example

- Each device has an incentive threshold to turn off.
- Linear approximation is an estimated sensitivity to incentive amount.



# How well do grid operators know their customers?


More  
Information

$$g_{u^*}(\mathbf{i})$$

1. Functional form:  $g_{u^*}(\mathbf{i})$



2. (Estimated) sensitivities:  $\nabla g_{u^*}(\mathbf{i})$



3. Grid measurements only (e.g., nodal voltage magnitudes)




Less  
Information


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
### Human Behavior Model



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### Numerical Evaluation



# Incentives for Optimal Power Flow

## Optimal Power Flow

(direct control of  $\mathbf{u}$ )

$$\min_{\mathbf{u}} \text{Cost}(\mathbf{u})$$

$$\text{s.t. } \underline{V} \leq \text{Voltage}(\mathbf{u}) \leq \bar{V}$$

$$\mathbf{u} \in \mathcal{U}$$

Indirect



## Incentivized Optimal Power Flow

(influence of  $\mathbf{u}$  via  $\mathbf{i}$ )

$$\min_{\mathbf{i}} \text{Cost}_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i})$$


$$\text{s.t. } \underline{V} \leq \text{Voltage}(g_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i})) \leq \bar{V}$$

$$\mathbf{i} \in \mathcal{I}$$

Example:  
 $\text{Cost}_{\mathbf{u}^*}(\mathbf{i}) = \|\mathbf{i}\|_1$

(Could be used to determine  $\mathbf{u}^*$ )






## Feedback-based Control

- Grid Measurements are the feedback that updates the dual variables.
- Incentives are updated based on locational relation to the dual variables.


## Knowledge of Behavior

## Control Algorithm

1. Functional form:  $g_{u^*}(\mathbf{i})$



2. (Estimated) Incentive Responsiveness:  $\nabla g_{u^*}(\mathbf{i})$



3. Grid measurements only (e.g., nodal voltage magnitudes)



Dual Ascent

First-Order Primal-Dual

Zero-Order Primal-Dual

More Information




Less Information

Voltage Measurements  $\hat{v}_t$

# First-Order Primal-Dual Control Algorithm


- Requires:
  - Estimated Incentive Responsiveness  $\hat{S}$
  - Linearized Power Flow  $R$
- $\text{Cost}_{u^*}(\mathbf{i}) = \|\mathbf{i}\|_1$




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
### Human Behavior Model



### Incentive Optimization



### Numerical Evaluation




# Setup: Time-varying human behavior

## Objectives:

- Keep voltage above 0.9 p.u. with minimum total incentive.
- Compare First-Order and Zero-Order Primal Dual Algorithms.

- Time-varying human behavior with 6 devices per customer randomly coming on- and off-line.
- First-Order Algorithm has access linear approximations.




- Time-varying base loads from UMass Amherst Smart Data Set (1-minute granularity).
- IEEE 33-bus distribution system.



Incentives are effective at providing voltage support.

- First-order with rough estimated sensitivities is more efficient than Zero-order.



**Problem:** Grid operators lack control over end-user load behavior.

**Approach:** Dynamically optimize individualized incentives paired with load set points.

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#### Human Behavior Model

Realistic Flexible Model  
that integrates with  
Optimization Algorithms.

#### Incentive Optimization

Control algorithms that  
account for different  
behavior knowledge  
scenarios.

#### Numerical Evaluation

Dynamic incentives are  
effective at providing  
grid support in realistic  
scenarios.

Future direction: Expand human behavior model with state dependencies.



# Dynamically Learning Incentives for Load Control

## Thank You!

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2410.14936>

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